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Abstract
We introduce an analytical framework close to the canonical model of plat-
form competition investigated by Rochet and Tirole (2006) to study pricing
decisions in two-sided markets when two or more platforms are needed simul-
taneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The model developed
is a natural extension of the Cournot-Ellet theory of complementary mono-
poly featuring clear cut asymmetric single- and multihoming patterns across
the market. The results indicate that the so-called anticommons problem ge-
neralizes to two-sided markets because individual platforms do not take into
account the negative pricing externality they exert on the other platforms.
As a result, mergers between such platforms may be welfare enhancing, but
involve redistribution of surplus from one side of the market to the other.
Moreover, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights however is
not monopoly pricing, indicating that there also exist diﬀerences with the re-
ceived theory of complementarity.
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Cournot (1838, 1971) was the ﬁrst to investigate a market structure in which two
producers have a monopoly on goods that are complements in the production of a
third composite good. The striking conclusion of Cournot’s complementary mono-
poly theory is that welfare in this particular industry decreases with the number of
individual producers, a result also known as the anticommons problem.1
Whereas the problem of the commons stems from inadequately deﬁned property
rights,2 the problem of the anticommons is exactly opposite: the negative externality
results from too many individual owners, who in their pricing decision do not take
into account their impact on total demand, see Heller (1998) and Buchanan and
Yoon (2000).
With this in mind, consider markets where eﬀective communication is composite
by nature in that it can only be produced by simultaneously conveying information
to diﬀerent agents. This would be the case if each agent in the market needs to be
aware of a particular alternative’s existence in order for that alternative to stand
a chance of being chosen. To the extent that each agent uses his own channel to
acquire this information, these channels are complements.
For example, if a tour operator wants to promote and sell a new destination as the
ideal trip for the entire family to spend a holiday, he needs to send this information to
all the decision makers in a household, implying the use of diﬀerent complementary
information channels. If the tour operator in some way communicated the exquisite
features of this destination to both parents but forgot to inform the adolescent
children, there is a distinct possibility that the proposed destination will not be the
one withheld by the family as a whole, and hence that it will not be chosen as the
next holiday destination.
The recent theory of two-sided markets (see e.g Armstrong, 2006; Parker and
Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006), approaches information and
communication channels as platforms connecting two distinct sides of a market. On
one side of the market, there is a group of consumers who wants to get informed.
They buy a magazine to ﬁnd out about their ﬁeld of interest. This is the magazine’s
readership and constitutes the “target group” to producers located on the other side
of the market. This side of the market wants to “get information across,” and does
so by buying advertising space in the magazines. As we will deal with applications
1Cournot’s ﬁndings with respect to the pricing of complementary goods by monopolists each
providing a component are dual to his results on the quantity decisions taken by oligopolists in
the presence of a Walrasian auctioneer, as shown by Sonnenschein (1968).
2See Gordon (1954), Scott (1955) and Hardin (1968) for the original contributions on the
commons problem and Gibbons (1992) for an illuminating game-theoretic analysis.
1other than newspapers and magazines later on, we will refer to the reader and
advertiser sides of the market as “receivers” (consumers) and “senders” (producers)
respectively.
A prominent research question in the two-sided markets literature addresses
agents’ single- and multihoming patterns. Much in the spirit of the chicken-and-egg
problem that underlies the business model of platforms, one can raise two oppos-
ing arguments with respect to the localization of these patterns. The ﬁrst states
that one side of the market singlehomes because of preferences or tastes, and hence
that the other side has to consider multihoming, thus explaining why competing
platforms are sometimes used simultaneously (See Rochet and Tirole, 2003, Section
3).
Conversely, our paper deals with examples where the platforms are complements
by necessity due to technical, biological, cultural or legal reasons,3 forcing one side
(senders) to multihome. As a consequence the receiver side rationally will single-
home. This kind of complementarity therefore constitutes a necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for explaining asymmetric single-and multihoming patterns across
the market, i.e., why one side of the market singlehomes, together with complete
multihoming on the other side. Since this approach is novel yet quite prominently
present in reality, we dedicate eﬀort to illustrate and argument the complementarity
of platforms.
The paper’s main contribution however aims to illustrate the implications of
platform complementarity on platform pricing structures. A number of interesting
research questions arise: is complementarity beneﬁcial to the sender (multihom-
ing) or receiver (singlehoming) side? What about mergers between complementary
platforms? (Can Cournot’s results be extended to two-sided markets?) Does ex-
treme fragmentation of property rights induce monopoly outcomes in the presence
of complementary platforms?
As such, the model developed in this paper lies at the crossroads of two important
strands in the economic literature, borrowing elements and combining insights from
(i) the two-sided markets literature (see e.g Armstrong, 2006; Parker and Van Al-
styne, 2005; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006), and (ii) the theory on complementary
goods (see e.g. Cournot, 1838, 1971; Ellet, 1839, 1966; Economides and Salop, 1992;
Gaudet and Salant, 1992; Feinberg and Kamien, 2001).
Many modern network industries feature both complementarity and two-sided-
ness, and as such three studies are related to our analysis. First, Carrillo and Tan
3Another source of complementarity could be political: if the decision-making process requires
unanimity, all voters have to be convinced, for example all family members in choosing the holiday
destination in the tour operator’s example.
2(2006) study consumers’ single- or multihoming decisions in a setting where third
parties oﬀer goods and services that are complementary to the ones provided by
two competing horizontally diﬀerentiated platforms. Whereas their focus lies on
the impact of platform diﬀerentiation and the number of complementors on plat-
form pricing structures, our paper—while simultaneously providing an explanation
for asymmetric “homing” patterns—stresses the impact of platform complementa-
rity on the pricing structure. We do so by comparing ensuing prices and proﬁts
under diﬀerent platform ownership structures, taking our cue from the theory on
complementary goods.
Second, and related to Carrillo and Tan (2006), Economides and Katsamakas
(2006) tackle the same issue of the optimal two-sided pricing strategy but from the
point of view of proprietary versus open source platforms. Our paper shares their
framework of analysis in the presence of diﬀerent industry structures. However, while
these authors consider vertical integration between platforms and complements, our
model emphasizes horizontal integration between complementary platforms.
Still another perspective is taken by Doganoglu and Wright (2006), studying
the inﬂuence of consumer multihoming on compatibility decisions by ﬁrms. At the
heart of their analysis lies the observation that although compatibility between ﬁrms
increases consumers’ network beneﬁts, these can also be obtained when consumers
choose to multihome should ﬁrms decide to remain incompatible. In our model, plat-
form complementarity assures that singlehoming consumers (receivers) fully realize
cross-market network beneﬁts.
To shed light on the aforementioned issues, this paper is structured as follows:
in Section 2 we further elaborate on the complementarity of platforms by examining
a number of mini case studies that have been chosen because of policy relevance, as
well as their illustrative nature with respect to the complementarity of platforms.
Section 3 introduces the model we use to investigate pricing decisions by comple-
mentary platforms in two-sided markets and presents the basic results. Among other
things, we show that the problem of the anticommons extends to two-sided mar-
kets, but not in a symmetric way. Reducing the number of independent platforms
increases social welfare (with redistribution of wealth), but increasing the number
of players does not destroy all sender surplus by convergence to the monopoly price.
Section 4 generalizes the setting to include the analysis of pricing behavior by bun-
dles composed of one- and two-sided components. This encompasses as special cases
both Cournot’s initial approach and the present model. Section 5 concludes.
3Figure 1: Generalized industry conﬁguration
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2 On the Complementarity of Platforms
In this section we document three cases in which the prevailing business models of the
industry are well captured by a model of complementary platforms. The discussion
always proceeds along the same lines: ﬁrst we provide some stylized facts that are
relevant to the industry under consideration. Next we indicate why its two-sided
nature is important and what explains for the complementarity of the providers.
Given the latter, it follows that one side of the market (fully) multihomes, whereas
for the other side it then becomes rational to singlehome.
As an example, consider Figure 1 depicting the generalized industry conﬁguration
where a range of complementary platforms serve two distinct sides of the same
market, senders and receivers respectively.4 In particular, note that while each
platform serves its own segment of receivers (singlehoming), it simultaneously serves
many senders who are forced to multihome in order to reach cross-market agents
eﬀectively. As a result, for a single transaction senders pay the sum of prices of all
platforms present in the market, as opposed to the receivers who pay a single fee to
the platform they exclusively patronize.
4In Figure 1 the arrows emanate from the price-setting entity.
42.1 Financial and Legal Advertising in a Multilinguistic Coun-
try
On December 20, 2005 the Belgian Antitrust Authority approved of a merger be-
tween the only two remaining ﬁnancial newspapers in the country, however not
without conducting lengthy further investigations and imposing restrictions.5 The
results of the present paper show why the merger was welfare enhancing and thus
should not have been delayed. Moreover, the conditions imposed hardly made sense
given the complementary nature of advertising in this particular market.
Following up on European Commission practice, see Recoletos/Unidesa and
Gruner and Jahr/Financial Times/JV,6 the Belgian Antitrust Authority partitioned
the market for advertising in three distinct submarkets: (1) the market for thematic
advertising, (2) the market for legal and ﬁnancial advertising, and ﬁnally (3) the
market for job advertisements, see Van Cayseele (2006). Especially the second mar-
ket is important for the particular merger that was proposed since it involved the
Dutch language ﬁnancial newspaper “De Tijd” and the French language ﬁnancial
newspaper “L’Echo.”
Reﬂecting both historical and cultural diﬀerences between the two major commu-
nities constituting Belgium, “De Tijd” and “L’Echo” respectively cater for readers
in the Dutch-speaking part of the country, Flanders, situated in the North, and their
French-speaking counterparts in Wallonia, situated in the South. In the market for
legal and ﬁnancial advertising, each paper connects investors from a speciﬁc linguis-
tic regime with companies that want to convey “information,” e.g., an announcement
for the general assembly to be held in the near future.7 As such, this particular mar-
ket is two-sided and newspapers act as platforms connecting cross-market agents.
To protect investors’ interests, companies situated in Belgium—irrespective of their
regional origin—are required by law to publish their information in the diﬀerent
languages, Dutch and French.
Thus, in order to reach Dutch-speaking investors, companies place their an-
nouncements in “De Tijd” and simultaneously buy advertisement space in “L’Echo”
to interact with French-speaking investors. From the point of view of the companies
both newspapers are necessary (and thus complementary) inputs into the provision
5See decision 2005–C/C–56 on cases CONC–C/C–03/050, N.V. Rossel & Cie/N.V. De Pers-
groep/N.V. Editeco, and MEDE–C/C–05/0068, N.V. Uitgeversbedrijf Tijd/N.V. Editeco.
6See respectively the European Commission decision of 1 February 1999 on case IV-M.1041,
Recoletos/Unidesa, Pb. 17 March 1999, C 73/06, and the decision of 20 April 1999 on case IV-
M.1455, Gruner and Jahr/Financial Times/JV, Pb. 31 August 1999, C 247/05.
7Related events are extra-ordinary meetings of the general assembly, with topics on the agenda
such as stock splits, raising capital, ...
5Figure 2: Belgian ﬁnancial newspapers
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of corporate information, forcing companies to multihome. Investors on the other
hand singlehome; they buy a single ﬁnancial newspaper and through its comple-
mentary nature, consequently stay informed on all companies’ activities. Figure 2
provides a schematic overview of this particular industry setup.
The results presented in Section 3 indicate that the merger between “De Tijd”
and “L’Echo” actually increases welfare as measured by lower total prices and higher
industry proﬁts. Hence, the condition imposed by the Belgian Antitrust Authority
so as to remedy the alleged negative consequences of the proposed merger did not
make sense as it prohibited discounts for joint advertising in “De Tijd” and other
newspapers belonging to the merged group, such as “L’Echo.” This is particularly
the case because ﬁnancial and legal advertising was explicitly mentioned to be pre-
cluded from discounts for a combined advertisement. Moreover, we show that prices
on the receiver side are likely to increase post-merger, but often what readers pay
is subject to a price cap.
The complementary nature of newspaper and magazine advertising may well
reach far beyond the example of legal and ﬁnancial messages in a multilinguistic
country. Besides the example of the tour operator who wants to sell a destination
to a family with unanimity voting, we may have a look at advertising by platforms
themselves. Considered separately, heterosexual dating clubs are platforms that
connect the two distinct sides of the market they operate in, namely single men and
single women. However, to advertise their activities to potential customers they rely
on the services of other platforms embodied by magazines that speciﬁcally cater for
6Figure 3: Gender-biased magazines and heterosexual dating clubs
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the preferences of heterosexual men and women.
As such, these constitute two separate information channels through which dat-
ing clubs can reach agents on both sides of the market, see Figure 3. So, to the
extent that heterosexual single men are inclined to only read gender-biased maga-
zines (and similarly single women focus on one magazine), both sexes singlehome.
These gender-biased magazines then are complements whose advertising services
will need to be consumed as a bundle by dating clubs. As in the previous example,
the demand for platform services by dating clubs will be governed by the sum of
fees (total fee) charged by the platforms under consideration.
Compared to legal and ﬁnancial advertising in a multilinguistic country, the seg-
mentation of the groups in this case is not cultural (by language) but biological (by
sex), and, the cause of complementarity is not the law, but taste (heterosexual pref-
erences). The eﬀect however is exactly the same: the advertisement services oﬀered
by the gender-biased magazines are tied together in the same way the legal and
ﬁnancial advertising opportunities oﬀered by the ﬁnancial newspapers are linked: as
complements.
2.2 Clearing Houses, Patent Pools, and Technology Licens-
ing
Clearing houses match technology suppliers with potential users. They can have a
very general approach providing a marketplace for a variety of technologies. Or they
7Figure 4: Patent pools and clearing houses
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can be specialized, well aware of the potential of a certain technology, and actively
searching for potential licensees, providing an array of supporting services.8
In the present context, we focus on the case of specialized clearing houses trying
to match the patentholders they represent with a variety of licensees. From their
specialized knowledge of the technology underlying the patent they will actively seek
for applications. As a result of these activities they collect payments from both sides
of the market, and hence can be modeled as platforms. Figure 4 provides a conﬁgu-
ration of the economic relationship between patentholder and licensee meeting over
a clearing house.
Innovations nowadays build on a variety of patented inventions. The result is that
patents are complements and the patentholders, when negotiating royalties, again
generate a negative pricing externality upon each other. Shapiro (2001) showed in
a (one-sided) Cournot (complementary monopoly) model that patent pools, com-
bining the ownership of the patents involved in the innovations, increase welfare.
Subsequent research contributions by Lerner and Tirole (2004) have relaxed the
8An example of the former could be the internet marketplace yet2.com, an example of the
latter pharmalicensing.com. Interestingly, yet2.com’s revenue structure is detailed on its website,
see http://www.yet2.com/app/about/usingsite: reﬂecting its two-sided nature revenue is gen-
erated from two activities, (1) searching for technology, a basic search tool which in an Adobe
Reader-style is free but can be upgraded at a cost, and (2) selling technology, where costs depend
on the type of membership, e.g., from individuals, selling one technology at a time, to unlimited
annual listing memberships. They also charge a commission (with a minimum of $10.000) on every
technology transfer arrangement facilitated by its services.
8complementary feature of patents to allow patents to become substitutes as the
price of technology (license fees to be paid) for the innovations increases to the level
where “dropping” a patent from the bundle comes into consideration.
The model presented in this paper re-assumes perfect complementarity, but in
a two-sided context.9 The analysis shows that clearing houses, when allowed to act
as a pool, increase their proﬁts and surplus to the end-users. This result thus shows
explicitly that pools facilitate the dissemination of inventions, yet at a price to the
patentholders. The net eﬀect of patent pools on the incentive to innovate therefore
is ambiguous: on the one hand the patent pool increases the number of end-users
and hence the amount of royalties paid, but on the other hand the patentees pay a
higher fee to the platform.
The patent pool problem shows that besides cultural or biological segmentation,
also technological specialization can be a source of segmentation. Technological
clearing houses specialize in certain technologies (biomedical, electronic, ...) and
a patent-holding innovator with a speciﬁc technology will oﬀer his technology to
the market over that platform. Or there is specialization on the supply side of
technology, but on the demand side users need many complementary inventions
managed by several clearing houses, which therefore are complementary platforms.
2.3 Urban Location and Conglomeration
Another area of research where complementarity was stressed is the economics of
urban location, shopping malls and supermarkets, see Stahl (1987) and Klemperer
(1992). In this literature it is well recognized that the presence of one retail shop may
attract another, illustrating the complementarity between e.g. a grocery store, a fast-
food outlet and a pharmacy. It is also well-known that the higher individual shop
prices, the less attractive the overall shopping area becomes. Even supermarkets in
a multi-stop shopping context face such pricing externality, see Manachotphong and
Smith (2007).
At the same time the externality across market sides has been noted as well,
and especially shopping malls are seen to be platforms that connect retailers with
consumers. As it is often the case in two-sided markets, one side of the market
9Undoubtedly, many examples exist in the context of combining several patented technologies
into one innovation, getting a new product on the market. A particular one which ﬁts the present
model well involves ultra high-speed cameras and ultra slow-motion image reproduction, see for
example i-movix’ SprintCam which combines internally developed server technology with external
Photron cameras. Over 60% of the contracts the provider of the “recording technology” is involved
in, is in combination with the ultra-slow reproduction technology provider. Both activities however
involve diﬀerent technologies, covered by diﬀerent patents. But the market for sports television
needs both, regardless whether it covers soccer, cycling, tennis, golf, ...
9Figure 5: Bundle with complementary one- and two-sided components
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is a loss leader and needs to be subsidized by the other side of the market, which
generates proﬁts. For example, in shopping malls consumers get parking space for
free.
Nothing however prevents other providers of complementary services trying to
become part of the new “agglomeration.” The free parking space provided by the
shopping mall might convince car drivers to travel somewhat longer, which in turn
might attract a gas station to provide fuel. Typically, a gas station (or bus service) is
a one-sided component that links to the bundle, and this raises the question how the
price structure of the two-sided platform is aﬀected by the inclusion of a one-sided
component. Figure 5 shows the industry structure when this happens.
Shopping malls certainly are not an isolated example of the presence of a one-
sided component in the bundle. Bundles can be made up by several one- and two-
sided components. As an example of the latter, consider large-scale amusement
parks and modern theme parks such as Disneyland. These resorts try to lure tourists
by oﬀering them entertainment to be found nowhere else, ranging from adrenaline
soaked roller coaster rides to thematic shows, movies and performances. Connecting
tourists with performers and production houses (or even suppliers/manufacturers of
attractions) amusement parks can be considered as platforms in the market for
family-oriented entertainment.
Next, consider the typical on site McDonald’s at this very same Disneyland
resort. It connects hungry tourists with a speciﬁc desire to eat at McDonald’s with
producers of fastfood menu ingredients (such as hamburgers, buns, ketchup, fries
10and soft drinks), all vying to secure contracts so as to become exclusive suppliers to
that fastfood chain. Together, Disneyland Resort and McDonald’s are complements
to these visitors’ theme park experience as a whole. The fact that the two platforms
mentioned here—Euro Disney and McDonald’s—operate global purchasing centers
to deal with suppliers—which, once selected, will supply to the entire chain of outlets
of all players—serves to strengthen the complementary nature of this particular
industry.
Finally, consider the airline or railroad companies bringing tourists to Disney-
land. These are typically one-sided operators, but are as complementary as any of
the other two components. The current example can even be extended to include
hotel chains such as the Sheraton which can be added to the bundle should tourists
plan a prolonged stay at the amusement park.
As in the previous cases (see Subsections 2.1 and 2.2), some factors explain for
the segmentation of one side of the market while others for complementarity at the
other. Here it is again specialization in production together with complementarity
in consumption that entails the industry conﬁguration shown in Figure 1. While
complementarity beyond any doubt is less than perfect in the present case (Disney-
land visitors do not need to buy a hamburger on site or stay in a hotel while they
can drive their own car to get there), the implications for the pricing structure merit
close attention from the perspective of zoning laws. Often, these will conﬁne eco-
nomic activity to the area of the shopping mall, limiting the number of complements
that are bundled at the same location.
3 The Model
Assume a market with platforms i = 1,...,n exclusively providing their services
to two distinct sides of the market, referred to as senders and receivers. Given the
discussion in Section 2 and without loss of generality, assume that the receiver side
of the market singlehomes, whereas the sender side multihomes. As such, senders
rely on the services of all n platforms; receivers on the other hand only need a single
platform to successfully complete their transactions. We will refer to the charac-
teristic of receiver singlehoming and sender multihoming as the complementarity
assumption (CA).
Following the work by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Bolt and Tieman







a transaction mediated by a speciﬁc platform i, with beneﬁts distributed according to
a probability density function gR
i and corresponding cumulative distribution function
11GR
i , and where 0 < ¯ bR
i ≤ ∞. Similarly, senders are heterogeneous in beneﬁts bS ∈

0,¯ bS
with probability density function gS and cumulative distribution function
GS, and 0 < ¯ bS ≤ ∞.
3.1 Complementary Platforms
We additionally state the following conditions:
(C1) “Eﬀective” interaction between both sides of the market occurs between a
singleton sender and an n-tuple of receivers;
(C2) Receiver segments served by each platform are of equal size;
(C3) The receiver side singlehomes.
The complementarity assumption (CA) and condition C1 merely serve to charac-
terize this particular industry setup and constitute the “Maintained Assumption.”
C1 is relaxed by focussing on variable production ratio’s, see Subsection 3.3 be-
low. Conditions C2 and C3 are additional assumptions made out of convenience:
C2 substantially facilitates calculations, and C3 is a possible explanation for each
platform’s local monopoly over the receivers it serves (perfect segmentation). C3
states that a receiver makes a single discrete choice, which is perfectly rational in
the present setting as argued above.
The complementarity assumption (CA) induces full multihoming on the sender
side of the market: senders require the provision of services by all n platforms,
entailing a total fee A ≡
P
i pS
i , where pS
i ≥ 0 denotes the sender fee charged
by platform i. As such, sender quasi-demand for the bundle of platform services
becomes a function of the total fee charged and is deﬁned as
D
















= 1 − GS(A). Obviously, demand is zero for all
A ≥ ¯ bS. It follows from the deﬁnition of gS that sender quasi-demand is a decreasing










[1 − GS(A)] = −gS(A) < 0.
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= −gS(A) < 0.
To guarantee the existence and uniqueness of an optimum we additionally impose








As can be seen from (1), sender quasi-demand DS is the same for all platforms
due to the complementarity assumption. Also, from the point of view of the senders,
an implicit assumption is that the successful completion of a transaction requires
the platforms to be combined in the bundle in a 1:1 ratio, i.e., each platform is only
needed once in the interaction with the receivers on the other side of the market.
At ﬁrst sight the multihoming characteristic of the sender side of the market
seems to have important consequences for the quasi-demand structure on the receiver
side as demand for platform i’s services becomes a function of all the platforms’
prices charged to receivers (see Rochet and Tirole, 2003). In this case, let pR ∈ Rn
+
be the vector of receiver prices. Then the fraction of receivers choosing platform i





























.10 As receivers only
need acces to a single platform to complete a transaction with any of the senders on
the other side of the market, it is plausible to assume that they will singlehome.
The complementarity assumption however induces perfect segmentation on the
receiver side of the market to the extent that each platform exclusively serves its
own segment. In fact, complementarity and perfect segmentation are two sides of
the same coin, as illustrated extensively in Section 2. As a consequence, receiver
quasi-demand is a function of the own price only and is deﬁned as
D
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. Similar to sender quasi-demand,
we require DR




















10Note that this is equivalent to a discrete choice model where a receiver chooses the platform
that maximizes utility, see e.g. Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005).
13Common to the literature on standard two-sided markets, the utility a receiver
derives from the services delivered by platform i is increasing in the number of cross-
market participants, i.e. the senders. It is equal to the net beneﬁt from a transaction,
bR
i − pR

















, the complementary feature
of the market entails an expression for the utility that senders derive from the services
delivered by the bundle of platforms that is quite diﬀerent from the standard case: it
is equal to the net beneﬁt from a transaction, bS −A, times the number of receivers,
















Given (1) and (3), and assuming independence between sender and receiver ben-


























Assuming for simplicity that platforms incur a constant marginal cost c = 0 per























Additionally, assume that it is costless to produce the composite good, i.e., the
bundle of platform services. Imposing log-concavity on receiver and sender quasi-
demand ensures that the ﬁrst-order conditions for program (4) are both necessary
and suﬃcient for a maximum: as log-concavity is preserved under multiplication and
positive scaling (see Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, pp. 105–106), πi becomes log-
concave and its unique maximum is found by diﬀerentiating with respect to receiver
and sender prices. For ease of notation, let subscript I henceforth denote actions
taken by independent platforms, and let φ ≡ ¯ bR · ¯ bS. It now becomes possible to
prove the following proposition:
11Exogenously ﬁxing the number of potential transactions in the market at N, platform i’s total






DS(A). For simplicity we normalize N to 1.











2¯ bS −¯ bR
2n + 1
(6)
and make proﬁts equal to
πI =
 
n¯ bR +¯ bS3
φ(2n + 1)3 . (7)
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ΠI = nπI =
n
 
n¯ bR +¯ bS3
φ(2n + 1)3 . (10)



























































Zero conjectural variations (2) imply that we obtain a system of 2n equations in 2n






























i )]0 = −
DS(A)
[DS(A)]0, (15)
which replicates the result of Rochet and Tirole (2003): when platforms set prices
15pR
i and pS
i to maximize volume for a given total price pi = pR
i + pS
i , the volume
impact of a small variation in prices has to be the same on both sides, keeping in
mind that here the volume impact on the sender side is triggered by a change in the







































Then, under perfect segmentation and assuming equal supports of the distribution
of receiver beneﬁts, meaning b
R
i = b
R and ¯ bR
i = ¯ bR ∀i, we obtain in a symmet-















is symmetric), the system of best-response functions above can
be simpliﬁed and written in matrix notation as
"
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Notice we have used a uniform distribution of receiver and sender beneﬁts to obtain




k = R,S, yields the desired results. 
For n = 2, competition is characterized by a duopoly. The industry conﬁguration
for two complementary platforms under Bertrand price competition is shown in
Figure 6.










2¯ bS −¯ bR
5
(17)
12Log-concave quasi-demand functions are easily obtained from a uniform distribution of beneﬁts
with, respectively, probability density and cumulative distribution function gk(x) = 1/¯ bk and
Gk(x) = x/¯ bk for k = R,S. Quasi-demand then follows from the deﬁnition Dk(x) := Prob{bk ≥
x} = 1 − Gk(x) = (¯ bk − x)/¯ bk and is decreasing and log-concave in its argument: dDk(x)/dx =
−1/¯ bk < 0 and d2[lnDk(x)]/dx2 = −1/(¯ bk − x)2 < 0. As such, the quasi-demand function
in models of two-sided markets is the equivalent of the so-called reliability or survival function
¯ G(·) = 1−G(·) commonly used in reliability theory, see e.g. Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005, Section
3). Additionally, the use of uniform distributions avoids corner solutions arising from skewed
pricing distributions, see e.g. Bolt and Tieman (2004, 2006).
16Figure 6: Industry conﬁguration for n = 2 (Bertrand pricing)
Receivers Platform 1 Sender















2¯ bR +¯ bS3
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. (18)
A ﬁrst important result—from a welfare point of view—is that, unlike the Cour-
not-Ellet complementary monopoly theory (see Corollary 4), the bundle price as set
by independent complementary platforms does not approach the senders’ “choke”
level in the limit as the number of components (platforms) approaches inﬁnity:
Corollary 2 (Bundle Limit Price in Two-Sided Markets). As the number of plat-
forms grows to inﬁnity, the bundle price does not attain the upper bound imposed by
the sender choke level ¯ bS.




2n+1 = 2¯ bS−¯ bR
2 , where the last equality follows from de
l’Hˆ opital’s rule. Because ¯ bS − 1
2
¯ bR ≤ ¯ bS, this limit value is smaller than the sender
choke level. 
The presence of the receiver side thus acts as a counterweight that limits the
upward pressure on the bundle price exerted by an increasing number of components
(platforms). The reason that the choke level is never reached in two-sided markets
is that it is not beneﬁcial for platforms to do so: pushing the price on one side to its
choke level would eﬀectively kill oﬀ all quasi-demand on that side and hence proﬁts
given the “multiplicative” nature of revenues (and proﬁt function).
3.2 Complementary Platforms: Joint Ownership
Suppose now that the platforms are owned by a single entity which sets the price of
the bundle, A ≡
P
i pS
i , on the sender side and the receiver prices, pR
i , on the other
























With subscript J referring to the actions taken by the joint entity, we can now state
the following:
Proposition 2 (Complementary Platforms: Joint Ownership). Under joint owner-










2¯ bS − n¯ bR
3n
(20)
and make proﬁts equal to
πJ =
 
n¯ bR +¯ bS3
27n2φ
. (21)














2¯ bS − n¯ bR
3n
(23)
ΠJ = nπJ =
 
n¯ bR +¯ bS3
27nφ
. (24)
Proof. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to receiver prices are identical to the









































































































































































































Applying Cramer’s rule, pk
J =
|Ak|
|A| for k = R,S, yields the desired results. 
As can be seen from equation (26), the major diﬀerence with the results under
















in the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the individual sender prices. It is exactly
this which allows us to state the following proposition, extending the anticommons
problem to two-sided markets:
Proposition 3 (The Anticommons Problem in Two-Sided Markets). Compared with
independent complementary platforms, under joint ownership platforms set receiver
and sender prices such that
(i) the price level is lower:
pJ < pI, (28)












(iii) platform and industry proﬁts are higher:
πJ > πI (32)
ΠJ > ΠI. (33)
Proof. By comparison of the results in Propositions 1 and 2. 
As in the classic anticommons result, independent platforms charge too high a
sender price, exerting a negative pricing externality on the other platforms. As a
result, sender quasi-demand for the bundle of platform services decreases. Being a
two-sided market, this increase in sender pricers is oﬀset by a decrease in receiver
prices. This decrease however fails to compensate for the losses incurred on the
sender side, causing individual and industry proﬁts to decrease.
Similar to a multi-product monopoly (see Tirole, 1988, pp. 69–72), complemen-
tary platforms under joint ownership internalize negative pricing externalities, charg-
ing lower sender prices so as to decrease the bundle price [see equation (30)], thereby
increasing sender quasi-demand. The two-sidedness of the market is mirrored how-
ever by higher receiver prices, as indicated by the price structure [see equations (29)
and (31)]. Contrary to the previous situation, the gains on the sender side now
outweigh the losses on the receiver side.13 This result resembles the topsy-turvy
principle of platform pricing in standard two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole,
2006): an exogenous factor that leads to higher prices (and higher margins) on one
side of the market (the receiver side), induces platforms to lower prices on the other
side of the market (the sender side) since increasing volume on that side now be-
comes more proﬁtable. The exogenous factor that increases the receiver prices here
is the change in industry structure as platforms evolve from independent entities to
subsidiaries under a single entity.
Summarizing, a lower price level pJ combined with higher platform proﬁts πJ
entails that welfare in this particular industry decreases with the number of in-
dependent platforms and that Cournot’s complementary monopoly theory extends
13Note that for n = 1, prices and proﬁts are the same under both ownership structures.
20to two-sided markets. Consequently, mergers between such agents are not to be
discouraged from an antitrust point of view, a result already hinted at in Subsec-
tion 2.1.14
3.3 Variable Production Ratio
In this subsection we drop the implicit assumption that platforms are only needed
once in the “production” of the composite good. As such, let ai denote the number
of times platform i is needed in composing the bundle of platform services required
by a sender to successfully interact with receivers. The production ratio between





























i (A) ≡ aiD
S(A)







































which independent platforms tend to maximize when setting receiver and sender
prices, allowing us to state the following proposition:





i and β =
P
i ai, independent complemen-
14To be precise, a potential measure of welfare can be deﬁned as the unweighted (utilitarian)




for k = I,J. The extent to which welfare increases under joint ownership is then the diﬀerence
∆W = WJ −WI. As both senders’ surplus and industry proﬁts increase (∆CSS = CSS
J −CSS
I >
0,∆Π = ΠJ − ΠI > 0), this will ultimately depend on the redistribution of surplus from receivers
(∆CSR = CSR
J − CSR
I < 0) to the latter, or ∆W > 0 if ∆CSS + ∆Π > −∆CSR.
21tary platforms, needed in a production ratio ai :aj for the successful completion of a










2¯ bS − α¯ bR
α + 2β
, (35)




β¯ bR +¯ bS3
(α + 2β)3φ
, (36)
with proﬁts distributed according to aiα.

































































































































































i and β =
P
i ai. Then, noting that A =
P
i aipS = βpS, we
obtain the following system of equations:
"
2 1













Obtaining a solution for pk
I (k = R,S) then is a straightforward application of
Cramer’s Rule. 
Similarly, under joint ownership a single entity sets receiver and sender prices so

























i ai)2 and β =
P
i ai, under joint owner-
ship complementary platforms needed in a production ratio ai :aj for the successful










2¯ bS − γ¯ bR
2β + γ
, (38)




β¯ bR +¯ bS3
(2β + γ)3φ
, (39)
with proﬁts distributed according to aiγ.
Proof. By the same token, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to sender prices






































































i ai)2 and β =
P
i ai. In this case we obtain the system of
equations "
2 1













and a solution for pk
J (k = R,S) is found using Cramer’s Rule. 
It is clear that should ai = 1∀i (entailing α = 1 and β,γ = n), this variable
production ratio model reduces to the 1:1 production ratio (“perfect complements”)
case discussed in the previous subsections.
4 On the Two-Sidedness of Complements
As mentioned in Subsection 2.3, in reality bundles exist that simultaneously combine
two-sided (platforms) with one-sided components (traditional ﬁrms). We refer to
these as asymmetric bundles, with the term “symmetry” pointing to the unique
presence of components of a speciﬁc type, either one- or two-sided. This evidently
calls for a reinterpretation of the number of platforms n. Therefore, redeﬁne n as
the total number of components present in the bundle, and respectively denote by
n1 and n2 the number of one- and two-sided components, yielding
n ≡ n1 + n2.
This deﬁnition allows for a variety of bundle types, with extreme cases being sym-
metric compositions of either one-sided components (n1 = n,n2 = 0), or two-sided
components (n1 = 0,n2 = n). Any combination in between is an “asymmetric”
bundle (n1,n2 < n and n1 + n2 = n). As the symmetric two-sided case has been
treated by Propositions 1, 2 and 3, we focus attention on the remaining symmetric
24and asymmetric cases.
Maintaining the implicit assumption that components are used in a 1:1 ratio for
a successful completion of a transaction, the bundle price A in this more general a












With demand for the bundle still a function of the bundle price, two cases remain
to be analyzed: (1) the pricing of symmetric one-sided bundles, and (2) the pricing
of asymmetric bundles. With respect to the latter, we investigate the eﬀect of the
number of one- and two-sided components present in the bundle (i.e. the fraction
n1
n2) on the limiting price of the bundle itself.
4.1 Symmetric One-Sided Bundles: Complementary Mono-
poly
With n1 = 0,n2 = n and following Economides and Salop (1992), DS denotes de-
mand for the bundle composed of n1 one-sided complementary goods, and produced
by ﬁrms 1 to n1, each having a monopoly on the production of their respective com-
ponent. For ease of exposition, assume that n1 = 2. The deﬁning feature of the
complementary monopoly setting is that both monopolists face the same demand,





h ≥ 0 is the price charged for complement h = 1,2.
Assuming for simplicity that each good is produced at constant marginal cost



































































Now, suppose that both complements are produced by a single entity which sets










































































Note that this result holds regardless the number of one-sided components. There-
fore we can state the following:
Corollary 3 (Complementary Monopoly). For a bundle exclusively consisting of
one-sided components (n1 = n,n2 = 0), the two-sided complementary monopoly
result stated in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 leads to the complementary monopoly result
(Cournot, 1838, 1971) for one-sided markets.
Proof. Comparing (40) and (41), we ﬁnd that A > A∗. It follows that the price
for the bundle under complementary monopoly is twice (n1 times) as large as under
15Alternatively, taking the FOC with respect to the bundle price A immediately yields the same
result.
26integrated complementary monopoly, thus replicating Cournot’s anticommons result
for a one-sided market. 
What explains for this remarkable result? As stated by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi
(2006), any producer increasing the price of his component exerts a negative exter-
nality on the producers of the remaining complementary goods because demand
for the composite good DS decreases. This seller reaps the full beneﬁt of his price
increase in additional revenue but bears only part of the associated cost, which
is the corresponding reduction in the quantity demanded. An integrated comple-
mentary monopolist, bearing the full cost of such price increases, internalizes the
negative externality and sets a lower, proﬁt-maximizing bundle price. As such, this
is the horizontal equivalent of vertical integration to avoid the problem of double
marginalization (Spengler, 1950).






















(ii) In the limit the bundle price as set by independent components approaches the
choke level, while under joint ownership it attains half the choke level.
Proof. (i) Under symmetry, equations (42) and (43) follow directly from (40) and
(41); (ii) As the number of one-sided components approaches inﬁnity, we have re-
spectively limn1→∞ AI = limn1→∞
n1¯ bS







This subsection details the analysis of price-setting behavior in markets where plat-
forms team up with one-sided ﬁrms—referred to as components—to create a bundle
which senders need to consume as a whole to successfully interact with cross-market
agents (see Subsection 2.3). From a methodological point of view, we apply the
27blueprint developed in Section 3 to derive prices and proﬁts, and emphasize the role
played by the number of one- and two-sided components in this particular industry
setup.16








h is the sender fee charged by one-sided components, and pS
i the platforms’
sender fees. Just as in the standard one-sided complementary monopoly setting (see
Subsection 4.1), transaction volume for the components is equal to the demand for
the entire bundle, DS(A). With cC
h and ci respectively denoting the components’ and
the platforms’ marginal costs per transaction, the proﬁt function for the components
































Next, assume that ci = c ≥ 0 (i.e., platforms are symmetric), and that cC
h = θc with
θ ∈ [0,1]. For example, with θ = 1, components incur the same marginal cost per
transaction as do the platforms. For simplicity we again assume that c = 0.
Proposition 6 (Asymmetric Bundles). In asymmetric bundles composed of n1 one-




(n1 + n2 + 1)¯ bR −¯ bS
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n2¯ bR +¯ bS3
φ(n1 + 2n2 + 1)3, (47)
16We do not focus on prices under diﬀerent ownership structures here as it is easy to see that the
analysis of (i) mergers between two-sided components only where a single entity sets platform prices
on both sides of the market is a simple extension of the results found in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2,
(ii) mergers between one-sided components only hinges on the classic Cournot (one-sided) com-
plementary monopoly result, see Subsection 4.1, and (iii) mergers between one- and two-sided
components where a single entity sets all prices, in particular the bundle price, combines elements
from both (i) and (ii).
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n2¯ bR +¯ bS2
¯ bS(n1 + 2n2 + 1)2. (49)
The bundle price equals
AI =
(n1 + 2n2)¯ bS − n2¯ bR
n1 + 2n2 + 1
. (50)
Proof. As platforms individually set prices to maximize proﬁts, we again obtain the



















































































































































which, when invoking symmetry (pC
























1 n2 + 1 n1






















The application of Cramer’s Rule, pk
I =
|Ak|
|A| for k ∈ {R,S,C}, gives the desired
results. 
A closer look reveals that this general result encompasses both symmetric cases:
for n1 = 0 and n2 = n, the asymmetric model replicates results (5) and (6) for
receiver and sender prices set by independent complementary platforms. For n1 = n
and n2 = 0, the asymmetric model yields (42), the price for one-sided components.
A ﬁnal result following from equation (50) is that the two-sided characteristic
of the market tends to disappear as the number of one-sided components grows
large. Despite the presence of platforms, the market behaves as if it were one-
sided when the number of one-sided components approaches inﬁnity. On the other
hand, if the number of platforms approaches inﬁnity, the one-sided components
become relatively unimportant and the market tends to a two-sided market with
complementary platforms.
Corollary 5 (Asymmetric Bundle Limit Prices). (i) If the number of one-sided
components approaches inﬁnity the bundle price approaches the senders’ choke level,
replicating the Cournot-Ellet complementary monopoly result of Corollary 4; (ii)
30if the number of two-sided components grows large, the bundle price does not ap-
proach the senders’ choke level and replicates the complementary platform result
from Corollary 2.




n1 = ¯ bS;









We introduced a model that allows for the investigation of pricing decisions by
complementary platforms, extending Cournot’s anticommons problem to two-sided
markets. At the same time, this setting oﬀers a natural explanation for asymmetric
single- and multihoming patterns across the market.
We show that welfare in markets characterized by the presence of independent
complementary platforms is lower than with complementary platforms under joint
ownership, as the total fee charged is higher and platform and industry proﬁts are
lower. Similar to the anticommons problem in traditional one-sided markets, this
result arises because independent platforms fail to internalize the negative pricing ex-
ternality they exert on others. Under joint ownership, platforms charge lower sender
prices (and therefore a lower bundle price) and correspondingly make higher proﬁts.
The two-sidedness of the market however also induces the charging of higher receiver
prices, thus creating both “winners” and “losers” at the same time. However, the
gains realized by the senders and the increase in proﬁts made by the platforms allow
for the compensation of the losses incurred on the receiver side. Conversely, the ad-
verse eﬀects of the dilution of property rights on equilibrium pricing are mitigated
vis-` a-vis the case where only one side of the market is present.
Finally, we also show that both the complementary platform theorem and the
Cournot-Ellet complementary monopoly result arise as special cases of a general
setting where bundles consist of both one- and two-sided components. Given the
many problems in economics that arise from cultural or biological complementarity,
also often enforced legally, as well as the presence of network externalities, we are
conﬁdent that the present results will contribute to a better economic understanding
of some laws governing the interaction between individuals over platforms.
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